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REPORT

COUNTRY USSR (Georgian SSR)

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SUBJECT 1. Radio Sets in Georgia
2. Reception of Foreign Broadcasts
3. Comments on VOA Broadcasts

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 25X1

Soviet citizens were sufficiently well acquainted with general conditions in the USSR, and better acquainted than western officials could be the people were hungry for concrete information and especially for information about foreign countries. 25X1

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2. Reception of VOA broadcasts in Tbilisi was almost always poor, but was best between 2200 and 0200 local time. they frequently listened to VOA English broadcasts in Tbilisi. most other people who understood English did likewise. From 60 to 100 km. outside Tbilisi, the reception of Russian-language VOA broadcasts was quite clear. In most of Georgia, the best reception in the early morning hours (between 0500 and 0600) was on the 20-m. band; in the daytime hours, on the 25 and 30-m. bands; and at night, on the 40-m. band. in Tkvarcheli from 1947 through 1950 VOA broadcasts could be received quite clearly most of the 25X1

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time in spite of the jamming.

3. there were more than 100,000 radio sets in Georgia (30,000 in Tbilisi alone) and most were equipped for short-wave reception. 25X1 In Tkvarcheli, a town of 15-20,000 people, the Workers' Supply Division (Otdel Rabochevo Snabzheniya) of the Tkvarcheli Coal Mines Trust sold 1,500 radios in the three years between 1947 and October 1950. At least 70% of these radios were equipped for short-wave reception. The principal models sold by this supply division, of which he was chief accountant, were the following:

Model	No. of Tubes	Estimated Present Price
Moskvich	3 or 4	150 rubles
Rekord	5	300 rubles
Baku	5	500 rubles
Super-Rizhski	6	600 rubles
Ural 47	6	600 rubles
Baltika	7 or 8	700 rubles
Neva	8	700 rubles
Ural 49	6	800 rubles
Belarus	11 to 13	1,000 rubles

a. All of these models except the Moskvich were equipped for short-wave reception. The Moskvich, however, could pick up stations in Baku, Yerevan, and Ankara.

b. the Belarus especially fine instrument which, with a good aerial, could pick up VOA broadcasts even through severe jamming. It was very popular and could be purchased only on the basis of personal friendship with the sales personnel, through "connections", or by bribery. 25X1 25X1

4. There were no legal or official restrictions on the sale of radios and most elements of the population could and did buy radios, with the exception of employees of state farms whose wages were low and of collective farm families in the central regions of Georgia or in non-electrified areas. The collective farmers in the citrus-fruit area in western Georgia and in the grape-growing eastern areas were well off and could afford to buy radios just as easily as miners and managerial personnel. An adequate supply of spare parts, repair shops, and repairmen facilitated the maintenance of radios. An earlier shortage of radio tubes had been overcome. 25X1

5. People who lived in non-electrified areas had to be satisfied with battery sets, described as unsatisfactory, or with Soviet broadcasts on the local wired radio outlets which were available in almost all Georgian villages. Although everyone preferred to have a private radio, those who could not afford them or who did not live in electrified areas listened to programs devoted to entertainment and foreign news on the wired networks but usually turned off their loudspeakers during broadcasts of standard internal propaganda Entertainment and a "fresh word" about international affairs were valued highly by Soviet radio listeners. 25X1 25X1

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6. [redacted] listening was too dangerous to be described as either pleasant or as entertainment. Although there had been no official announcements forbidding the populace to listen to foreign broadcasts or mentioning punishments for such activity, people learned that it was "unofficially" forbidden. [redacted]

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7. [redacted] a great majority of radio listeners were interested in foreign broadcasts, even the most ardent Communists. Estimating that 70% of private radio owners in Georgia had sets equipped for short-wave reception, [redacted] perhaps 10% of them did not listen to foreign broadcasts simply because they were not interested in foreign affairs and were too busy with the problems of making a living. Another 10% who did not listen were people who believed Soviet propaganda to the effect that foreign broadcasts were full of lies and that they should listen to the truth as formulated in Moscow. ([redacted] the percentage of such people might be higher in the rest of the USSR than in Georgia, perhaps as high as 15%, except in the Baltic states, where it was probably the same as in Georgia.) The remainder of the short-wave radio owners were probably all interested in foreign broadcasts although some might have feared to draw attention to themselves by erecting aerials which would improve reception and others might have feared to listen because their walls were too thin or because they lived in congested conditions. Estimating that this latter group might total 10% of the short-wave owners, [redacted] approximately 70% of short-wave owners in Georgia listened to foreign broadcasts.

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8. Although many people listened to foreign broadcasts, they discussed them only with close friends and relatives. [redacted] People passed information on to their friends very seldom and very cautiously because one had to be very certain of one's friends. This was difficult because of the system of shadowing and espionage imposed upon the people. [redacted] people preferred not to talk and suggested that the favorite motto of the people was "silence is golden". [redacted]

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9. [redacted]

10. [redacted]

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Broadcasts from Ankara and Teheran were very restrained and not so interesting as those from Belgrade. These latter were exceptionally interesting at the time of Tito's defection from the Cominform.

11. 25X1

Georgian broadcasts were probably jammed even more intensively than Russian-language broadcasts in this area and were probably not heard in Tbilisi where he had resided from October 1950 until January 1952. the initiation of broadcasts in the minority languages an excellent idea 25X1 the national minorities would consider them important evidence that America thinks of them as well as of the Russian citizens of the USSR.

12. 25X1

Soviet authorities would not jam their own broadcasts regularly just in order to jam the VOA. Radio Tbilisi 25X1 operated on a frequency of 49.54 m. 25X1

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